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Abstract 
 
• The Asian economic giants, China, India, Japan and South Korea require secure supply of 
Gulf oil and gas resources to fuel their burgeoning manufacturing sectors.  
• Gulf countries find themselves in the fortunate position of seeing the 'Asian market' as an 
inexhaustible destination for their energy commodities.  
• Issues such as Iraq/Iran/Syria as well as the simmering internal problems within Gulf 
countries make the region an uncertain supplier, and, as time goes by, less able and willing to 
guarantee stability of supply to the international market owing to uncontrollable internal and 
external factors.  
• Piracy in the Arabia Sea, and the potential for war in the gulf, places uncertainty on 
the sea lines of communication between Gulf oil/gas and the Asian market, disruption 
of which will have a deleterious impact on international oil and gas prices and on the 
scale of Asian economic growth. 
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The Gulf and Asian Energy Requirements:  
Secure Supply or Oil on the Water? 
 
Dr. John Bruni, Director, SAGE International, Adelaide, South Australia 
 
The importance of the oil and gas resources of the Arabian Gulf to the continuing economic 
prosperity of contemporary East Asia cannot be underestimated. To be sure, many countries, 
including the US and China are attempting to wean themselves off these critical resources by seeking 
‘energy independence’. Domestic exploitation of shale oil, tar-sands and the rapid up-take of the 
technique of hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) are set to challenge but not displace the world’s 
dependence on Arabian light crude. 
 
 
This fact is underscored by the following figures. Of the four major Asian industrial powers: China, 
Japan, India and South Korea, the combined consumption is approximately 19,148,000 BBL/day of 
oil – some two-thirds of this figure extracted from the Middle East, specifically the Arabian 
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Peninsula. If one tallies up the supply of natural gas to the Asian industrial powers, one finds that 
China, Japan, India and South Korea account for an estimated combined consumption of 
350,500,000,000 cubic metres per year. These are by any measure, large numbers. The fact that it will 
take many years of research and development to see the fruits of today’s efforts at ‘energy 
independence’ mature into effective and efficient alternatives to the mature Arabian/Middle Eastern 
oil and gas fields, demonstrates clearly that in the near term, barring some unforeseen technological 
breakthrough, the industrial powers of Asia will remain dependent on the Gulf Arab States to fuel 
their economies.1 
 
This means that the security vulnerabilities of the very long maritime lines of supply from the Arabian 
Gulf to East Asia will likely continue to focus the minds of policy makers from Beijing, Tokyo, New 
Delhi, and Seoul. Diversification of supply is perhaps the easiest way around the problem of 
dependence on one particular hydrocarbon rich area. But the problem with diversification is that only 
the Gulf Arab States are blessed with the quantities of ‘light crude’ heavy industry favours because it 
is easy to extract from oil fields, is relatively cheap to pump from basins, needs less refining and 
burns more efficiently. Heavier oils from Latin America and Africa are certainly useful but they do 
not burn as efficiently, require more refining and are generally more polluting. There is also another 
aspect to heavy oils, i.e., they are slower and more expensive to extract.2  
 
Another obvious fix is to ensure that the countries dependent on maritime energy routes either: a) 
create their own space/naval capabilities to ensure they can detect, track and interdict threats that may 
arise or b) develop, with the US, the robust relationships necessary in order for world’s greatest space 
and maritime power to continue surveying/protecting these routes on their behalf. Both these options 
pose real and ever present security dilemmas to the states involved. If we look at the four Asian 
industrial powers i.e., China, Japan, India, and South Korea, each in their own way are bound by the 
realities of their positions in the international community. Barring South Korea, China, Japan and 
India have great power aspirations, which means that these countries’ national interests will inevitably 
clash with those of the US. This also means that while the Chinese, Japanese and Indians might, for 
their own reasons, choose to co-operate with the US on issues of mutual concern, this co-operation 
will not come easily, or without conditions.3 Launching major ship and submarine building 
programmes, let alone fleets of satellites, are multi-year, multi-billion dollar projects and while the 
Asian powers will want to have some independent capability to project national power into or over the 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs), especially to defend or to have a presence proximate to critical 
maritime oil and gas corridors – even at best estimates, no Asian power could, quantitatively or 
qualitatively, develop or replicate the global space and naval capabilities at the command of the 
American president. This therefore leaves large Asian states, ironically including China, America’s 
number one commercial and strategic competitor, with an uncomfortable truth, that is, that in the 
near-term at least, it too will need to engage the Americans diplomatically in order to gain 
                                                          
1 Appenzeller T., The End of Cheap Oil, National Geographic Magazine, 
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com.au/environment/global-warming/end-cheap-oil/ date accessed: 
18/04/2013 
2 Boardman Energy Partners, Facts About Crude Oil, http://benergypartners.com/Facts_About_Crude_Oil.html 
date accessed: 18/04/2013 
3 For an interesting view on how the world is dependent of the US Navy patrolling international waters see: 
Blair D. & Lieberthal K., Smooth Sailing: The World’s Shipping Lanes are Safe, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 
2007, pp.7-13. 
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Washington’s help to secure Chinese maritime national interests – especially when those interests are 
far from the Chinese mainland. 
Upstream Threats 
So what are the contemporary threats that make securing the energy sea lines of communication so 
very difficult? 
Up-stream, at the wellspring of the critical energy resources – the Arabian Peninsula, there are a 
number of significant concerns. The most immediate for the Arab states that make up the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) is the wash-up of the Arab Spring. While the wealthy Gulf Arab States have 
by and large avoided much of the political turmoil that gripped the poorer Arab states of North Africa, 
this does not mean that an undercurrent of political dissent has not made its presence felt.4 In 2011, 
sectarian violence flared up on the tiny Gulf island-state of Bahrain. What made this situation so 
potentially flammable is that Bahrain is home to the US Navy’s 5th Fleet, an element of the US Navy 
on constant alert over the strategic machinations of nearby Iran.  
 
BAHRAIN 
Bahrain is a divided state. With a majority Shiite population, a minority Sunni monarchy rules the 
country.5 The country’s Ministry of the Interior has actively, and in some instances brutally, crushed 
Shiite dissent against the Bahraini King. From the Bahraini monarchy’s perspective, much of the 
Shiite problem is not locally driven, but goaded by agents of Iran who covet the island and its 
strategic location.6 According to this narrative, Bahrain gives Iran a ‘free kick’. Its restive Shiite 
population gives Iran a natural local ally to aim at a ‘vulnerable’ Sunni monarch and his supporters. 
The presence of a major US naval base in Bahrain provides the Iranians the opportunity to give the 
impression of whipping up a firestorm of pro-Iranian, anti-American Shiite Bahraini hatred; the 
hypothetical flow-on of which would be for Iran to usurp the power of the Bahraini monarch and 
forcefully evict the US naval presence – all without Iran sending in a single soldier. Obviously the 
truth of this situation is far more complicated and ‘the Shiite order’ is riven by divisions that most 
outsiders, including neighbouring Sunni communities, either are not aware of, or simply refuse to 
believe. Nonetheless when the GCC decided that a fellow Sunni monarchy was imperilled, it acted. 
On March 14, 2011, Saudi and UAE forces drove into Bahrain to give local security forces the boost 
needed to bring the unrest under control.7 The Saudis in particular, being the largest Gulf oil producer, 
have a vested interest in supporting the Bahraini King. But a critical issue for Riyadh is that along the 
rich oil fields on the Saudi east coast, close to Bahrain, there are some 3 million Saudi Shiites. While 
a minority population, their employment in the Saudi oil industry places this group of people in a 
                                                          
4 The Arab Spring and the Middle East’s Monarchies, International Security Network (ISN) interview with 
Vidino L., Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security Studies, University of Zurich, Switzerland, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-
Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=160422&tabid=1454180072&contextid774=160422&contextid775=160421  date 
accessed: 18/04/2013 
5 Trouble in Bahrain: Shut up the Shias, The Economist, Middle East and Africa, September 9, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16994636 date accessed: 19/04/2013 
6 Dorsey J.M., The Shia-Sunni Divide: Tunnel Vision Prevails, Middle East Online, 17/04/2013, 
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=58181 date accessed: 19/04/2013 
7 Kane F. & Lessware J., UAE and Saudi Arabia send forces to Bahrain, The National, 15/03/2011, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/uae-and-saudi-arabia-send-forces-to-bahrain date accessed: 
19/04/2013 
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strategically critical position. To many in Riyadh, this local Shiite community is not a trustworthy 
servant of the Saudi monarchy, but is seen as a ‘5th columnist’ threat that could, if the Iranians have a 
hand in supporting it, bring down the whole Saudi oil industry.8 Therefore, from Riyadh’s 
perspective, intervention in Bahrain was not just about giving a hand to a fellow Sunni Gulf 
monarchy, but also about driving home to ambitious Shiite agitators along with their potential Iranian 
backers, that the Sunni Gulf Arab monarchs will stand by each other and not accept interference in 
‘their domain’. 
SYRIA 
Another significant threat that hangs over the Middle East, and over the Gulf Arab States in particular, 
is the ongoing violence in Syria. The Syrian civil war grew out of Sunni Syrian disaffection with the 
ruling Alawite minority ‘republican dynasty’ of the Al-Assad regime. In this country the majority are 
Sunni while the ruling minority, the Alawites, are considered by many to be an offshoot of the Shiite 
branch of Islam.9  According to most reports over the past two years, there have been an estimated 
70,000 men, women and children killed and hundreds of thousands uprooted by the fighting, either 
fleeing to neighbouring states as refugees, or being internally displaced. The problem with this civil 
war is that it plays to a much larger conflict – a conflict to roll back Iranian strategic power.10 Since 
the Alawites seized power in Damascus in 1971, they wanted to be seen as a force of Arab 
nationalism. Due to this, the Alawites deliberately downplayed their religiosity in favour of creating a 
secular Arab state along Ba’athist lines.11 This served the clever old Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad 
well during the heady days of the Cold War when he could lean upon his Soviet patrons for economic 
assistance. But, when Bashar accidently fell into his role as Syrian dictator in 2000, there was no 
Soviet patron for Syria. It was hoped among some circles that Bashar would rapidly liberalise Syria, 
free up the political structure and liberate the stultified Syrian economy. None of these things 
happened. In fact, Bashar, along with the old guard he inherited from his father, dug in his heels, 
consolidated Syria’s ties to Iran and willingly served as the pipeline to Iranian-sponsored terrorist 
groups Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Gaza Strip.  
 
With the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq at the hands of a US-led invasion in 2003, the 
unexpected happened. Rather than fearing American power and renouncing his ties to Iran, Bashar al-
Assad fortified Damascus’ ties to Tehran. And, in a stark reminder to both Israel and the West that 
Syria would remain an influential player in the Levant subregion of the Middle East, Syria gave 
critical support to Hezbollah’s short war with Israel in 2006, a war that while not a victory for the 
terrorist group, was neither a defeat. In fact Hezbollah held its own against the might of the IDF and 
by doing so dealt a reputational blow to Israel. But the Damascus-Tehran relationship was buying 
                                                          
8 Riedel B., Iran Seeks to Exploit Grievances of Saudi Arabian Shias, Al Monitor, November 9, 2012, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/iran-shia-saudi.html date accessed: 19/04/2013 
9 Butter D., Assad’s fate is in the hands of the Alawites, The World Today, Chatham House, Vol.68, No.7, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/185107 date accessed: 22/04/2013 
10 Yacoubian M., Syria’s Alliance with Iran, United States Peace Institute (USIP), May 2007, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/syria-s-alliance-iran date accessed: 22/04/2013 and Friedman G., Syria, Iran 
and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, Stratfor, November 22, 2011, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111121-syria-iran-and-balance-power-middle-east date accessed: 22/04/2013 
11 Profile: Syria’s ruling Ba’ath Party, BBC News Middle East, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
18582755 date accessed: 22/04/2013 
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fewer and fewer goods and services for the Syrian people.12 The economy might have been rancid, but 
the internal politics became even more repressive as Tel Aviv and Washington made it clear they 
believed the Syrian-Iranian relationship to be the major obstacle for peace in the Middle East. The 
more international pressure applied to Syria, the greater the internal pressure applied by the Alawite 
core to the largely disenfranchised Sunni majority. By 2011 and the start of the Arab Spring, there 
was no holding back. The Sunnis rebelled, helped along by the GCC States that have long 
sympathised with the oppressed Sunni Syrian majority.13 Former Iraqi Sunni militants and jihadists 
who fought the American presence after the wreckage of post-Saddam Iraq also aided the Syrian 
rebels. So far, the Syrian civil war has spilled over into Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and Turkey. These ‘spill-
overs’ into neighbouring states, however, have up till now been temporary. There has been no 
sustained fighting between Alawite and Sunni factions outside of Syria proper, although sectarian 
riven Lebanon seems to be the state most vulnerable to any expansion of the fighting within Syria, 
considering the historic ties between the two countries. The increasing amount of Gulf Arab support 
for the largely Sunni Syrian rebels, together with the presence of Iranian ‘volunteers’ in Syria fighting 
for the preservation of Assad and the Alawites, no one can be sure how this civil war will end. The 
more drawn out the Syrian civil war, the more likely that Iraq too will be sucked into this struggle. 
Post-Saddam Iraq is extremely fragile, and like Lebanon, sectarian riven. Should Iraq fail to keep the 
fighting in Syria on the Syrian side of the border and become fatally compromised as a consequence 
of its own unstable ethnic and sectarian issues, social and political instability in the northern Arabian 
Gulf might gradually drift south to include the GCC States themselves at the behest of an increasingly 
belligerent and cornered Iran. Even were this an outside possibility, the fact remains that any 
perceived threat to the oil and gas fields of the Arabian Peninsula may well see a significant increase 
in the cost per barrel of oil and that could have deleterious consequences for a struggling global 
economy. 
 
IRAN 
The other major threat to up-stream oil and gas suppliers comes from the possibility of a general war 
breaking out between the US and/or Israel and Iran over Iran’s nuclear programme. This possibility 
has been flagged in the international community since 2006 and at various times the language used by 
American, Israeli and Iranian political leaders has been particularly shrill. But as is the case with 
North Korea, the prospect of a general war breaking out seems to be driven more by media and 
academic speculation. But in the sphere of possibilities, nothing can be ruled out. If Iran moves to 
close the Strait of Hormuz – a critical maritime choke point – the effect on global oil and gas 
movements and prices will be severe. Even a temporary closure would raise the per barrel price of 
both commodities to levels that would damage global economic recovery and act as a brake on Asian 
industrial growth. But how would the Iranians achieve this goal?  
 
                                                          
12 Coutts A., Syria’s uprising could have been avoided through reform, The Guardian, 18/05/2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/18/syria-uprising-reform-bashar-al-assad date accessed: 
22/04/2013 
13 Clark M., Haunted by History: The Power Politics of the Sunni-Shia Divide, Popular Social Science, 
November 21, 2012, http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/11/21/haunted-by-history-how-the-sunni-shia-
divide-has-increasingly-come-to-determine-the-power-politics-of-the-middle-east/ date accessed: 22/04/2013 
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The Strait of Hormuz is some 39 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. The shipping lanes through 
the Strait are about 2-3 kilometres wide. Disrupting shipping through these narrows would be 
relatively simple, even for an internationally isolated state like Iran. Mobile coastal artillery (including 
anti-ship missiles); sea mines; fast attack craft (such as up-gunned speed-boats) and military planes 
harassing and attacking oil tankers; strategically laid shipping obstacles such as deliberately wrecked 
or derelict vessels; all pose realistic threats to the Strait.14 The US naval presence in Bahrain is no 
doubt aware and prepared for such eventualities, but planning for a threat in theory is very different 
from fighting a real war. Presently, Tehran’s threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz is more a 
deliberate defensive ruse. The eventuality of war is only likely if either the US or Israel take action to 
physically destroy the country’s nuclear infrastructure. The problem inherent in any such operation is 
the possibility of uncontrolled escalation. A closure of the Strait by Iran might become a prelude to an 
Iranian ballistic missile strike or terrorist attacks against a Gulf Arab capital or Israel. The idea that 
the US or Israel, alone or in partnership, could easily dispatch the Iranian theocracy and impose a 
political order on Iran which would be acceptable to their long-term strategic interests is questionable, 
following the debacles of the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
The Gulf monarchies on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula have attempted to mitigate against the 
vulnerabilities of transporting their primary commodities. They created a new network of oil and gas 
pipelines to depots on the Red Sea coast of western Saudi Arabia.15 This has certainly helped wean 
                                                          
14 For a systematic analysis of a potential Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz see – Talmadge C., Closing 
Time: Assessing the Iranian Treat to Close the Strait of Hormuz, International Security, Vol.33, Issue 1, pp.82-
117. 
15 Blanche E., Sidestepping the Strait, The Middle East Magazine, 
http://www.themiddleeastmagazine.com/news-detail.php?nid=18 date accessed: 22/04/2013 and Emirates, 
Saudis pump oil to bypass Hormuz, UIP.com, June 28, 2012, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-
Resources/2012/06/28/Emirates-Saudis-pump-oil-to-bypass-Hormuz/UPI-31001340902308/ date accessed: 
22/04/2013 
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the smaller Gulf States off their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. But overland pipelines present 
their own vulnerabilities (such as terrorist attack or aerial bombardment), so this is by no means ‘the 
silver bullet’ that guarantees supply to the global market. 
 
Downstream Threats 
INDIA-PAKISTAN 
Downstream threats also exist to the stability of oil and gas supply to Asia. Looking further east, the 
state of continual tension between Pakistan and India presents a source of deep instability in South 
Asia. Pakistan and India are no strangers to conflict, having fought three high intensity wars – 1947, 
1965 and 1971. While India achieved ‘nuclear status’ in 1974 with its ‘Smiling Buddha’ peaceful 
nuclear test, India’s entrance as a nuclear weapons state was not officially confirmed until the May 
1998 Pokhran-II series of nuclear tests which were quickly followed up by Pakistan’s Chagai-I series 
of nuclear tests. International condemnation notwithstanding, neither India nor Pakistan were forced 
to stop their nuclear weapons programmes.16 In fact tensions reached a high point the following year 
between these two countries when Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants, on the Pakistani side of 
the disputed Jammu-Kashmir border, penetrated the Indian side – sparking a significant clash of arms 
known as the Kargil Incident (May-July 1999).17 While this was a short-sharp exchange of fire 
between the regular forces of Pakistan and India, there was the potential for rapid escalation when 
reports emerged that Pakistan was mobilising its nuclear assets and deploying them close to the Indian 
border. This situation forced Washington’s hand and the Clinton administration quickly interjected 
diplomatically to calm the situation down.18  
 
This is a clear example of the inherent instability of Indo-Pakistani relations and while the current 
governments in New Delhi and Islamabad are trying to manage their relations well, deep mutual 
suspicions remain. Kashmir is still in dispute between India and Pakistan and it is unlikely to be 
resolved anytime soon. But probing this relationship further, we see that bilateral Indo-Pakistani ties 
are fraught by many other issues that could spark a major war. There is the current proxy war being 
fought between the two states for influence in contemporary, failing Afghanistan for strategic 
advantage in the Hindu Kush. There are the frequent Indian accusations of Pakistan’s active support 
of jihadist terrorism within India,19 particularly but not exclusively, among India’s western states 
neighbouring Pakistan where large Indian Muslim communities exist. Indeed, sectarian violence in 
                                                          
16 The Risk Report, India-Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons Update, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 
Vol.4, No.6, November-December 1998, Washington DC, 
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/nuke98.html date accessed: 23/04/2013 
17 For more information see: 1999 Kargil Conflict, GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm date accessed: 23/04/2013 and Tellis, A.J., Fair 
C.C. and Medby J.J., Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the 
Kargil Crisis, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450 date accessed: 23/04/2013 
18 Talbott S., The Day a Nuclear Conflict was Averted, YaleGlobal Online, September 13, 2004, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/day-nuclear-conflict-was-averted date accessed: 23/04/2013 
19 Ramesh R., Indian PM accuses Pakistan agencies of supporting Mumbai terror attacks, The Guardian, 
January 6, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/06/mumbai-attacks-india date accessed: 23/04/2013 
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Gujarat is often blamed by some members of the Indian government and Hindu extremists (especially 
the BJP) on Pakistani subterfuge.20  
 
Then there is the issue of Pakistan itself. Once, a very close ally of the United States,21 but now cast 
out of the inner circle due to the double game Islamabad has been accused of playing with the US 
over its nuclear weapons program, its ballistic missile program and more recently, its support of 
Taliban militants in Afghanistan. Pakistan is now neither a friend nor an ally of the US. At least 
significant sections of the Pakistani security/intelligence services are openly considered enemies of 
the US and Western interests in Afghanistan.22 The more moderate elements of the Pakistani political 
elite are finding it hard to voice their opposition to the military hard-liners who see their interests 
threatened by American interference in Afghanistan and their attempts to influence events within 
Pakistan itself. Military hard-liners, many of whom sympathise with anti-American jihadists,23 are 
more interested in preserving the privilege of the politicised military institution, than co-operating 
with civilian politicians whom they perceive as weak and open to foreign influence. Since 9/11, 
Pakistani politics has become divided between an ineffectual civilian leadership prone to corruption 
and a fragmented military/security/intelligence complex.24 While not officially considered a failed 
state, Pakistan’s inability to create the perception of harmonious relations among its civil-military 
core, gives the impression that a catastrophic break in central authority is only a matter of time. This 
would make Pakistan a failed state. The problem with this is that other failed states are not nuclear 
weapons states. Pakistan is. And the notion that there might be a time when elements of the 
fragmented Pakistani military/security/intelligence complex allows ‘loose nukes’25 to create an 
existential crisis for India or for US forces operating in or around Central/South Asia, is a nightmare 
scenario. In this scenario, India, with the possible assistance or direct involvement of the US, would 
need to conduct military operations against Pakistan to neutralise the threat. This could very well lead 
to a war that would not just vanquish Pakistan but destroy the central authority of the state itself. The 
central question in this hypothesis is, could such a devastating conflict be confined within the borders 
of Pakistan?  
 
                                                          
20 Pakistan dismisses India’s allegations over riots in Gujarat, Islamweb English, 07/05/2002, 
http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=articles&id=15161 date accessed: 23/04/2013 
21 This was during the early-mid Cold War period, when Pakistan was considered a key state in the Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) 1955-79. Pakistan’s usefulness to US interests continued during the period of the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 1979-88, when Pakistan acted as an American conduit to the anti-Soviet 
resistance, the Mujahedeen. By the early 1980s though, the US-Pakistani relationship started to drift and was 
further complicated by China’s increased importance to Islamabad’s ambitions to check Indian strategic growth. 
22 Boot M., Frenemies in Pakistan, The Weekly Standard, The Magazine, Vol.17, No.4, October 10, 2011, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/frenemies-pakistan_594669.html date accessed: 23/04/2013 
23 Lindell R., Pakistani intelligence helping Taliban: NATO report, ABC (Australia) News, February 2, 2012, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-02/leaked-nato-report-finds-taliban-pakistan-links/3806102 date accessed: 
23/04/2013 
24 For more on the internal political problems besetting contemporary Pakistan see: Akram M., Pakistan’s 
Political Cliff, Dawn.Com Opinion, January 20, 2013, http://dawn.com/2013/01/20/pakistans-political-cliff/ date 
accessed: 23/04/2013 and Jenkins W.C., An Elusive Balance: Explaining Pakistan’s Fluctuating Civil-Military 
Relationship, An MA Thesis in Security Studies, Submitted to Georgetown University Washington DC, April 
16 2010 
25 Mowatt-Larssen R., Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism, Arms Control 
Today, July/August 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/Mowatt-Larssen date accessed: 
23/04/2013 
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The People’s Republic of China is a friend of Pakistan and since America’s abandonment of its 
former ally, Beijing saw advantage in befriending Islamabad and becoming its main source for 
military hardware, including nuclear and ballistic missile technology. China, as part of its attempt to 
push back American containment, has devised a ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, which includes Pakistan 
and projects Chinese naval forces into the Indian Ocean.26 China and Pakistan both view India with 
suspicion, however, in Pakistan’s case, it is more a case of outright hostility. This serves China’s 
interests well. Keeping India off-balance and focussed on modernising its military, directing the bulk 
of it along the country’s shared western border with Pakistan, takes money that could be better spent 
on investing in the country’s ramshackle infrastructure or to alleviate poverty. This would make India 
more economically competitive with China. However, Pakistan’s usefulness to China might not save 
the country from total destruction at the hands of India were militants or jihadists armed with a 
nuclear warhead ‘procured’ from the Pakistani military stockpile sent on a ‘mission’. War, however it 
comes to the Indian Subcontinent, will not be easy to defuse and it would be a mistake to assume that 
the littoral seas around India and Pakistan will not be a key area of conflict. Again, terrible 
consequences for the price of oil and gas moving out from the Gulf and toward East Asia. 
 
PIRACY 
Over the past 15 years piracy has become an increasing threat to ships traversing the Indian Ocean. 
Initially the pirates who operated from the East African coast, but especially from the failed state of 
Somalia, were not particularly good at catching their quarry. But over time they increased their 
tactical skills, aided by a number of factors, some of which are hard to prove, but there is some 
anecdotal evidence. For instance, where do these pirates get their information on shipping movements 
from? How can poorly armed, poorly equipped pirates in retrofitted fishing boats come to pose such a 
threat to modern shipping? Outside assistance? Perhaps from white-collar criminals engaged in 
                                                          
26 Ali G., China’s strategic interests in Pakistan’s port at Gwadar, East Asia Forum, March 24, 2013, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/24/chinas-strategic-interests-in-pakistans-port-at-gwadar/ date accessed: 
23/04/2013 
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regional shipping and maritime insurance firms? Sophisticated organised crime seems to be at the 
head of this crisis, but little is made of this owing to the woeful lack of evidence. 
To be sure there is money to be made through piracy.27 
 
 
 
Prior to the assembly and deployment of a multi-national squadron of warships off the Somali coast, 
piracy was endemic in the western part of the Indian Ocean. Cruise ships passing through the Suez 
Canal and Red Sea were attacked or harassed; smaller cargo vessels were captured and ransomed back 
to their owners; then large container vessels and more lucratively still, crude carriers were attacked. 
Most famously, in 2008 was the capture by Somali pirates of the MV Sirius Star.28 This was the 
biggest ship ever to fall to modern pirates. The vessel was not just new (commissioned in early 2008), 
it was of the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) class. This meant it had the capacity of holding some 
350,000m� of crude oil – a large haul by any estimate. The pirates attacked the Sirius Star some 
830kms off the Kenyan coast and sailed the ship back into Somali waters, anchoring it at the port of 
Harardhere. At the time of its capture the ship was carrying 320,000m� of crude, in other words, one 
quarter of Saudi Arabia’s daily output of crude oil with an estimated value of $US100 million. In the 
end, the crew was safely released and a ransom of $US3 million was paid for the vessel’s return to its 
Saudi owners.29 As a consequence of this action, NATO30 and a number of other states dependent on 
                                                          
27 Marchal R., Somali Piracy: The Local Contexts of an International Obsession, Humanity: An International 
Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 2011, pp.31-50 and United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Maritime Piracy, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 2010, pp.193-200. 
28 Seized tanker anchors off Somalia, BBC World News, November 19, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7735507.stm date accessed: 23/04/2013 
29 Pflanz M., Sirius Star oil tanker released after £2 million ransom paid, The Telegraph, January 9, 2009, date 
accessed: 23/04/2013 
30 Already in this area on counter-piracy missions but severely embarrassed by the capture of the MV Sirius Star 
(see: Wadhams N., As Somali Pirates Get Bolder, Policing Them Gets Tougher, Time Magazine, November 19, 
2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1860404,00.html date accessed: 23/04/2013) NATO 
launched a more robust counter-piracy mission – Operation Ocean Shield see: NATO Website, Maritime 
Command, Operation Ocean Shield Factsheet, 
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the smooth transit of oil from the Arabian Gulf, including India and China, dispatched warships to 
patrol the waters off Somalia. This had some effect. But there are never enough ships and crews 
dedicated to anti-piracy operations to cover the vast expanse of sea. Interestingly enough, Somali and 
other pirates from East Africa now operate far out to sea, over 1,000 nautical miles from the African 
coast. Moving out and dispersing makes them difficult targets to identify, track and apprehend, 
especially since they normally operate in wooden boats that are hard to detect by satellite or radar 
imaging. Then of course, operating in the territorial waters of other states confuses the jurisdictional 
and sovereignty issues faced by international counter-piracy authorities. 
 
One of the major effects of piracy has been the dramatic increase of insurance premiums on ships 
operating in or through the Indian Ocean. In order to combat the deficiency of warship patrols, some 
shipping companies are ‘securitizing’ their fleets with private security personnel on vessels traversing 
through pirate-infested waters. Those who stand to profit most in this arrangement are the insurance 
companies, and the private security firms eagre to diversify and find new niche roles to fill post-Iraq 
and post-Afghanistan. Also profiting from this are non-state actors, such as terrorist groups who seek 
to use established piracy logistics networks to transport men and materiel to conflict zones.31 
However, not all shipping companies can afford to step up the onboard security of their ships or 
afford the insurance premium price hikes in which case many ships, their cargo and crews are not 
protected from loss.32  
 
The only thing that can put an end to the scourge of piracy originating from East Africa is political 
stability and economic progress. Putting a halt to the depletion of fish stocks off East Africa ought to 
be considered a vital first step, as it would assist the traditional fishermen to provide for their 
families.33 
 
 
CHINA/NORTH KOREA 
CHINA 
Finally, the last of the major downstream threats to oil and gas shipments to the Asian industrial 
giants are two, intertwined issues – China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea). 
The notion of China being a rising power has been covered well enough in the literature of 
contemporary international relations to suggest this as a ‘given’. But as China is rising, its relations 
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with the global hegemonic power, the US, is becoming more problematic. So much so, that presently 
China and the US are engaged in what can only be termed somewhat clumsily, an ‘asymmetric cold 
war’.34 China is nowhere near being considered an equal to the US, neither in terms of its economic 
nor its military weight. But it is a significant power and actor on the international stage. As a 
significant power with a historic legacy as a regional hegemon, China’s ambition, (as far as Western 
analysts can tell), is to restore China to this historic role. Also, to ensure that the country is cohesive 
enough to never again fall to the predations of foreign commercial and strategic competitors like it 
had done during the Hundred Years of Humiliation period (1849-1949). Objectively, this makes good 
strategic sense. It is a rational solution. That is, unless one comes from a state whose historic role was 
to pay tribute to China. This would put into place an informal structure of regional subservience to 
Beijing, however, returning to servitude might not suit countries that had been liberated from 
Japanese imperialism (1945) and European imperialism (1945-75). 
 
Washington understands that China’s inability to convince its neighbours to bandwagon with it is a 
flaw in contemporary China’s strategic and economic position. And it is a flaw that the US is willing 
to use. The Obama administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ is a clear signal to the smaller powers of Asia, as 
well as to traditional region allies, Japan and Australia, that they will not be abandoned in the face of 
Chinese economic advances.35 Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is another tool to hem in 
Chinese power. In fact, while the language used by the US government has been relatively mild and 
somewhat inscrutable, what is being arranged is a containment of China.36 
 
 
                                                          
34 For more information see: Qin C., New Cold War? China-USA Economic Espionage War Escalates, 
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World Economic Forum, What If There Was a New Cold War Between the US and China? Time Magazine, 
November 28, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/11/28/what-if-there-was-a-cold-war-between-the-u-s-and-
china/ date accessed: 23/04/2013; Xuetong Y. & Haixia Q, How to avoid US-China Cold War, The Diplomat, 
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Beijing, however, understands this and is taking counter-measures. These counter-measures are not 
peer-on-peer. The Chinese understand that they are still in no position to challenge the US directly. 
But this does not mean that the Chinese are not without their own diplomatic tricks. China’s 
commercial dominance on the African continent is showing to the world, particularly the former 
colonial powers of Europe, that they are unable to compete in this modern ‘great game’.37 The US, 
having its own economic issues to deal with, can only play the securitisation card – promising that a 
US presence can help defeat local anti-government insurgents, militants and jihadists. This US 
security presence, when accepted by an African state with an existing significant Chinese presence, 
can also be used to monitor Chinese economic activities.  
 
China’s other area of international interest is the South Pacific.38  
 
Considered by some as a rapidly ‘africanising’ region,39 Beijing sees advantages in being able to co-
opt local tribal leaders, abandoned by all except voracious multinational organisations, charitable 
institutions and multilateral economic entities such as the IMF. By exploiting local corruption, 
Chinese business deals are designed to lock up the South Pacific’s rich fisheries and drive out 
competition from other Asian states coveting the same resource, especially Taiwan, Japan and South 
Korea. Chinese interest in areas the rest of the international community ignores, can be seen as part of 
a larger asymmetric strategy of ‘pushing back’ American ‘containment’.  
 
Closer to the Chinese mainland, the South and East China Seas loom large as more direct areas of 
contention between the US, its Asian allies and China. The idea of limited maritime conflict in these 
regions is real considering that Beijing hopes that its navy, while still extremely limited in skill and 
capability vis-à-vis the naval strength of Japan and the US, can dominate these littoral waters. In 
doing so, however, Beijing has already alienated much of Southeast Asia, co-claimants to the 
supposed oil and gas wealth under the South China Sea,40 by ignoring the legitimacy of these claims 
and intimidating Southeast Asian states with a modern version of ‘gun-boat’ diplomacy. Deploying 
Chinese naval ships into disputed waters as a means of demonstrating that while weak by US and 
Japanese standards, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is strong by Southeast Asian 
standards and can readily enforce Beijing’s regional prerogatives if needed – is the name of the game. 
Further north, China’s current dispute over the status of the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is 
both a strategic as well as a resource issue. Strategic, in that a Japanese back down would mean 
Tokyo acquiesces to Chinese intimidation and that would cripple Japanese international prestige and 
standing as a regional great power. A more robust Japanese response to this Chinese challenge could 
play to China’s advantage in that it might spark a major internal debate on further watering down the 
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provisions of the controversial Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and that would reverberate 
negatively throughout Asia, placing Japan on the diplomatic defensive. What may sooth Asian 
concerns is a pro-active US acting as an obvious cap on potential Japanese counter-measures to 
Chinese provocation. 
 
Even if the great power games in the Western Pacific do not set off a major confrontation or war 
between China and the US, or China and Japan in the near-term, military exercises, especially live fire 
drills during a period of heightened tension, could block established Asian trade routes and force 
maritime traffic to make expensive detours to avoid the prospect of sailing through potential conflict 
zones. 
 
NORTH KOREA 
Since North Korea let off its third nuclear test in February 2013, tensions on the Korean Peninsula 
have risen to crisis point (again).41 What makes the current round of tensions different from pervious 
ones, is that the new leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, is 29 years old and considered by many in 
the international community as untried. He has to prove his credentials to the generals (and old guard) 
of the Korean People’s Army. If the younger Kim can steer the DPRK through this current crisis (of it 
own making) intact and with some Western concessions, he will be seen as the legitimate heir to his 
late father Kim Jong Il and be allowed to rule without internal challenge. Should Kim fail to deliver 
and plunge the DPRK into a cascading series of crises that he cannot back away from, Kim Jong Un 
will be removed from the North Korean leadership and replaced by someone more pragmatic. This is 
an interesting game for it supposes that neither South Korea nor the US will take decisive action to 
force Kim’s hand.  
 
Perhaps it is assumed that China, North Korea’s only formal ally, will stand by North Korea.  
 
Pyongyang has, after all, proven to be a useful strategic buffer for China against the US, and a useful 
pawn against commercial competitors, South Korea and Japan.42 The fact that Beijing wants the status 
quo to remain speaks of its desire to maintain a divided Korea. This, geographically at least, keeps the 
US and its South Korean and Japanese allies at arms length from Chinese territory. This Chinese 
psychology plays also into South Korea’s mindset. It does not want to pick up the tab for 
reunification. Seoul believes such a move would deal a major blow to South Korea’s economy. Japan 
also fears a reunified Korea because, according to some analysts, this may open up South Korean 
investment to the highly disciplined, cheap labour market of North Korea and ‘turbo-charge’ Korean 
economic prospects. Then there are questions as to whether under the conditions of reunification, 
South Korean authorities would dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program or its nuclear 
weapons. It may just prefer to continue building a Korean nuclear deterrent that can be used against 
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both China and Japan. Considering the contemporary history of Korea since the end of World War II, 
this possibility cannot be discounted.43 
 
In spite of all the speculations, the current crisis might go one of two ways.  
 
The first and most likely is that after a period of more belligerent rhetoric from the North, perhaps 
backed up by a missile test, another nuclear test or an assault on an unimportant piece of disputed 
territory between the Koreas, tensions will de-escalate and the normalcy of ‘cold war’ return. The 
second possibility is that the younger Kim may misjudge his strength and prowess and put North 
Korea on a path to existential destruction. But, those ‘faceless men’ watching him will want to 
maintain themselves, their dystopian state system, and therefore the status quo. Then of course, the 
Chinese would not want the burden of militarily intervening in North Korea since this would presage 
a Chinese occupation, turning North Korea from a useful proxy into an expensive vassal-state. While 
neither of these prognostications would be ruinous for the delivery of Gulf oil to the industrial titans 
of China, South Korea or Japan, disruptions of supply can be expected were maritime traffic diverted 
away from potential areas of conflict or contention. The only really catastrophic scenario to Gulf oil 
imports to Northeast Asia would come from a war on the Korean Peninsula. And while useful to 
contemplate such contingencies, a war seems unlikely under present circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
The above ‘rough guide’ on the potential security challenges to the contemporary maritime energy 
routes from the Arabian Gulf to the Asian industrial giants serves to illustrate that there is neither a 
quick nor easy fix for any of the players involved. Upstream and downstream there is no ‘smooth 
sailing’. It is expected that the GCC States, China, Japan, India, and South Korea individually or 
collectively, will seek to maintain much of the current status quo. That is, they will, at various times, 
reach diplomatic solutions with the US, or with each other, to keep the hydraulic wealth from the 
Arabian Peninsula flowing. 
 
One of the intriguing aspects is the role of the US as it moves towards energy independence. Will the 
US want to continue to guarantee oil and gas supplies by using the enormous military instrument of 
the US Navy? Ever since the beginning of America’s climb to super-power status, Washington 
derided its allies for not doing enough to strengthen their own naval and military capabilities. 
Ironically, it is this inaction that by default made the US ‘first among equals’ – a title Washington 
may not have sought, but once given, turned it to US strategic and commercial advantage. The end of 
the Cold War saw the US alone, with no peer or near peer competitor able or willing to challenge 
American power. But that did not mean that the world itself was without a dynamism that steadily 
chipped away at American power. The destruction of the Soviet Union may have erased an existential 
threat to the West, but it also paved the way for other state and non-state actors to challenge the US 
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order asymmetrically. Failed states drew US military and diplomatic strength into areas truly foreign 
to even the best minds of the Washington beltway. Wars of choice further sapped American will to 
intervene in places most Americans had never even heard of. The US of today, as technologically 
sophisticated and wealthy as it is perceived by many, does no longer appear interested in the role of 
global policeman. There is a weariness to this hegemon that might over time, and at the domestic 
political level, see America gradually revert back to its former great power, isolationist position. Even 
some American academics are giving credence to the idea that America as a global power is tired and 
defeated. Kaplan argues: 
 
NATO is simply not what it used to be. US forces in the Pacific are perceived to be less all-
powerful than in the past…But most importantly, US President Barak Obama is evolving a 
doctrine of surgical strikes against specific individuals combined with non-interference – or 
minimal interference – in cases of regional disorder. Libya and Syria are cases in point. 
Gone, at least for the moment, are the days when US forces were at the ready to put a 
situation to rights in this country or that.44 
 
So, if there is even a kernel of truth to this statement, can the Asian industrial giants depend on the 
United States to keep its war machine at the ready to maintain the sea lines of communication? India 
and China, as traditional land powers, might choose to rely on land routes to the Arabian Gulf. 
Overland pipelines, while having their own security risk profile, are a cheaper form of transportation 
for oil and gas to Asia, and if attacked, can be quickly repaired and brought back into action.  
The current attempt by China to secure its primacy over the estimated oil and gas wealth under the 
South and East China Seas, may bring about an acceleration of diplomatic tensions, which could 
ultimately lead to limited naval and aerial skirmishes between contesting parties. Should such 
skirmishes eventuate, they would necessitate energy shipping from the Gulf to be re-routed from 
established navigable sea-lanes. This, again would raise the cost of oil and gas internationally and act 
as a brake on economic activity in Asia, with global implications. 
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